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Living in the Multiverse
Opening Talk at the Symposium ”Expectations of a Final Theory” at
Trinity College, Cambridge, September 2, 2005; to be published in
Universe or Multiverse?, ed. B. Carr (Cambridge University Press).
Steven Weinberg
Physics Department, University of Texas at Austin
Most advances in the history of science have been marked by discoveries
about nature, but at certain turning points we have made discoveries about
science itself. These discoveries lead to changes in how we score our work,
in what we consider to be an acceptable theory.
For an example look back to a discovery made just one hundred years
ago. As you recall, before 1905 there had been numerous unsuccessful ef-
forts to detect changes in the speed of light due to the motion of the earth
through the ether. Attempts were made by Fitzgerald, Lorentz, and others
to construct a mathematical model of the electron (which was then con-
ceived to be the chief constituent of all matter), that would explain how
rulers contract when moving through the ether in just the right way to keep
the apparent speed of light unchanged. Einstein instead offered a symmetry
principle, which stated that not just the speed of light but all the laws of
nature are unaffected by a transformation to a frame of reference in uniform
motion. Lorentz grumbled that Einstein was simply assuming what he and
others had been trying to prove. But history was on Einstein’s side. The
1905 Special Theory of Relativity was the beginning of a general acceptance
of symmetry principles as a valid basis for physical theories.
This was how Special Relativity made a change in science itself. From
one point of view, Special Relativity was no big thing — it just amounted
to the replacement of one 10 parameter spacetime symmetry group, the
Galileo group, with another 10 parameter group, the Lorentz group. But
never before had a symmetry principle been taken as a legitimate hypothesis
on which to base a physical theory.
As usually happens with this sort of revolution, Einstein’s advance came
with a retreat in another direction: The effort to construct a model of
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the electron was suspended for decades. Instead, symmetry principles in-
creasingly became the dominant foundation for physical theories. This ten-
dency was accelerated after the advent of quantum mechanics in the 1920s,
because the survival of symmetry principles in quantum theories imposes
highly restrictive consistency conditions (existence of antiparticles, connec-
tion between spin and statistics, cancelation of infinities and anomalies) on
physically acceptable theories. Our present Standard Model of elementary
particle interactions can be regarded as simply the consequence of certain
gauge symmetries and the associated quantum mechanical consistency con-
ditions.
The development of the Standard Model did not involve any changes
in our conception of what was acceptable as a basis for physical theories.
Indeed, the Standard Model can be regarded as just quantum electrodynam-
ics writ large. Similarly, when the effort to extend the Standard Model to
include gravity led to widespread interest in string theory, we expected to
score the success or failure of this theory in the same way as for the Stan-
dard Model: String theory would be a success if its symmetry principles and
consistency conditions led to a successful prediction of the free parameters
of the Standard Model.
Now we may be at a new turning point, a radical change in what we
accept as a legitimate foundation for a physical theory. The current ex-
citement is is of course a consequence of the discovery of a vast number
of solutions of string theory, beginning in 2000 with the work of Bousso
and Polchinski.1 The compactified six dimensions in Type II string theories
typically have a large number (tens or hundreds) of topological fixtures (3-
cycles), each of which can be threaded by a variety of fluxes. The logarithm
of the number of allowed sets of values of these fluxes is proportional to the
number of topological fixtures. Further, for each set of fluxes one obtains a
different effective field theory for the modular parameters that describe the
compactified 6-manifold, and for each effective field theory the number of
local minima of the potential for these parameters is again proportional to
the number of topological fixtures. Each local minimum corresponds to the
vacuum of a possible stable or metastable universe.
Subsequent work by Giddings, Kachru, Kallosh, Linde, Maloney, Polchin-
ski, Silverstein, Strominger, and Trivedi (in various combinations2) estab-
1R. Bousso and J. Polchinski, JHEP 0006, 006 (2000).
2S. B. Giddings, S. Kachru, and J. Polchinski, Phys. Rev. D66, 106006 (2002); A.
Maloney, E. Silverstein, and A. Strominger, hep-th/0205316; S. Kachru, R. Kallosh, A.
D. Linde, and S. P. Trivedi, Phys. Rev. D68, 046005 (2003).
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lished the existence of a large number of vacua with positive energy densities.
Ashok and Douglas3 estimated the number of these vacua to be of order 10100
to 10500. Susskind4 gave the name “string landscape” to this multiplicity
of vacua, taking the term from biochemistry, where the possible choices of
orientation of each chemical bond in large molecules leads to a vast number
of possible configurations. Unless one can find a reason to reject all but a
few of the string theory vacua, we will have to accept that much of what we
had hoped to calculate are environmental parameters, like the distance of
the earth from the sun, whose values we will never be able to deduce from
first principles.
We lose some, and win some. The larger the number of possible values
of physical parameters provided by the string landscape, the more string
theory legitimates anthropic reasoning as a new basis for physical theories:
Any scientists who study nature must live in a part of the landscape where
physical parameters take values suitable for the appearance of life and its
evolution into scientists.
An apparently successful example of anthropic reasoning was already at
hand by the time the string landscape was discovered. For decades there
seemed to be something peculiar about the value of the vacuum energy ρV .
Quantum fluctuations in known fields at well-understood energies (say, less
than 100 GeV) give a value of ρV larger than observationally allowed by a
factor 1056. This contribution to the vacuum energy might be canceled by
quantum fluctuations of higher energy, or by simply including a suitable cos-
mological constant term in the Einstein field equations, but the cancelation
would have to be exact to 56 decimal places. No symmetry argument or ad-
justment mechanism could be found that would explain such a cancelation.
Even if such an explanation could be found, there would be no reason to
suppose that the remaining net vacuum energy would be comparable to the
present value of the matter density, and since it is certainly not very much
larger, it was natural to suppose that it is very much less, too small to be
detected.
On the other hand, if ρV takes a broad range of values in the multiverse,
then it is natural for scientists to find themselves in a subuniverse in which
ρV takes a value suitable for the appearance of scientists. I pointed out in
1987 that this value for ρV can’t be too large and positive, because then
3S. K. Ashok and M. Douglas, JHEP 0401, 060 (2004).
4L. Susskind, hep-th/0302219
3
galaxies and stars would not form.5 Roughly, this limit is that ρV should
be less than the mass density of the universe at the time when galaxies first
condense. Since this was in the past, when the mass density was larger than
at present, the anthropic upper limit on the vacuum energy density is larger
than the present mass density, but not many orders of magnitude greater.
But anthropic arguments provide not just a bound on ρV ; they give
us some idea of the value to be expected: ρV should be not very different
from the mean of the values suitable for life. This is what Vilenkin6 calls
the “principle of mediocrity.” This mean is positive, because if ρV were
negative it would have to be less in absolute value than the mass density
of the universe during the whole time that life evolves, since otherwise the
universe would collapse before any astronomers come on the scene,7 while
if positive ρV only has to be less than the mass density of the universe at
the time when most galaxies form, giving a much broader range of possible
positive than negative values. In 1997-8 Martel, Shapiro, and I8 carried out
a detailed calculation of the probability distribution of values of ρV seen
by astronomers throughout the multiverse, under the assumption that the
a priori probability distribution is flat in the relatively very narrow range
that is anthropically allowed. At that time the value of the primordial rms
fractional density fluctuation σ was not well known, since the value inferred
from observations of the cosmic microwave background depended on what
one assumed for ρV . It was therefore not possible to calculate a mean
expected value of ρV , but for any assumed value of ρV we could estimate σ
and use the result to calculate the fraction of astronomers that would observe
a value of ρV as small as the assumed value. In this way we concluded
that if ΩΛ turned out to be much less than 0.6, anthropic reasoning could
not explain why it was so small. The editor of the Astrophysical Journal
objected to publishing papers about anthropic calculations, and we had to
sell our article by pointing out that we had provided a strong argument for
abandoning an anthropic explanation of a small value of ρV , if it turned out
to be too small.
Of course, it turned out that ρV is not too small. Soon after this work,
5S. Weinberg, Phys. Rev. Lett. 59, 2607 (1987).
6A. Vilenkin, Phys. Rev. Lett. 74, 846 (1995)
7J. D. Barrow and F. J. Tipler, The Anthropic Cosmological Principle (Clarendon,
Oxford, 1986).
8H. Martel, P. Shapiro, and S. Weinberg, Astrophys. J. 492, 29 (1998). For earlier
calculations, see G. Efstathiou, Mon. Not. Roy. Astron. Soc. 274, L73 (1995); S.
Weinberg, in Critical Dialogues in Cosmology, ed. N. Turok (World Scientific, 1997).
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observations of type Ia supernovae revealed that the expansion of the uni-
verse is accelerating,9 and gave the result that ΩV ≃ 0.7. In other words the
ratio of the vacuum energy density to the present mass density ρM0 in our
subuniverse (which I use just as a convenient measure of density) is about
2.3, a conclusion subsequently confirmed by observations of the microwave
background.10
This is still a bit low. Martel, Shapiro, and I had found that the probabil-
ity of a vacuum energy density this small was 12%. I have now recalculated
the probability distribution, using WMAP data and a better transfer func-
tion, with the result that the probability of a random astronomer seeing a
value as small as 2.3ρM0 is increased to 15.6%. Now that we know σ, we
can also calculate that the median vacuum energy density is 13.3ρM0.
I should mention a complication in these calculations. The average of
the product of density fluctuations at different points becomes infinite as
these points approach each other, so the rms fractional density fluctuation
σ is actually infinite. Fortunately, it is not σ itself that is really needed
in these calculations, but the rms fractional density fluctuation averaged
over a sphere of co-moving radius R taken large enough so that the density
fluctuation is able to hold on efficiently to the heavy elements produced in the
first generation of stars. The results mentioned above were calculated for R
(projected to the present) equal to 2 Mpc. These results are rather sensitive
to the value of R; for R = 1 Mpc, the probability of finding a vacuum energy
as small as 2.3ρM0 is only 7.2%. The estimate of the required value of R
involves complicated astrophysics, and needs to be better understood.
Now I want to take up four problems we have to face in working out the
anthropic implications of the string landscape.
I What is the shape of the string landscape?
Douglas11 and Dine12 and their co-workers have taken the first steps in
finding the statistical rules governing different string vacua. I can’t comment
usefully on this, except to say that it wouldn’t hurt in this work if we knew
what string theory is.
9A. G. Riess et al., Astron. J. 116, 1009 (1998); S. Perlmutter et al., Astrophys. J.
517, 565 (1999).
10WMAP collaboration, Astrophys. J. Suppl. 148 (2003).
11M. R. Douglas, hep-ph/0401004; Compt. Rend. Phys. 5, 965 (2004).
12M. Dine, D. O’Neil and Z. Sun, JHEP 0507, 014 (2005); M. Dine and Z. Sun, hep-
th/0506246.
5
II What constants scan?
Anthropic reasoning makes sense for a given constant if the range over
which the constant varies in the landscape is large compared with the an-
thropically allowed range of values of the constant, for then it is reasonable
to assume that the a priori probability distribution is flat in the anthrop-
ically allowed range. We need to know what constants actually “scan” in
this sense. Physicists would like to be able to calculate as much as possible,
so we hope that not too many constants scan.
The most optimistic hypothesis is that the only constants that scan are
the few whose dimensionality is a positive power of mass: the vacuum energy,
and whatever scalar mass or masses set the scale of electroweak symmetry
breaking. With all other parameters of the Standard Model fixed, the scale
of electroweak symmetry breaking is bounded by about 1.4 to 2.7 times its
value in our subuniverse, by the condition that the pion mass should be small
enough to make the nuclear force strong enough to keep the deuteron stable
against fission.13 (The condition that the deuteron be stable against beta
decay, which yields a tighter bound, does not seem to me to be necessary.
Even a beta-unstable deuteron would live long enough to allow cosmological
helium synthesis; helium would be burned to heavy elements in the first
generation of very massive stars; and then subsequent generations could have
long lifetimes burning hydrogen through the carbon cycle.) But the mere
fact that the electroweak symmetry breaking scale is only a few orders of
magnitude larger than the QCD scale should not in itself lead us to conclude
that it must be anthropically fixed. There is always the possibility that the
electroweak symmetry breaking scale is determined by the energy at which
some gauge coupling constant becomes strong, and if that coupling happens
to grow with decreasing energy a little faster than the QCD coupling then
the electroweak breaking scale will naturally be a few orders of magnitude
larger than the QCD scale.
If the electroweak symmetry breaking scale is anthropically fixed, then
we can give up the decades long search for a natural solution of the hierarchy
problem. This is a very attractive prospect, because none of the “natural”
solutions that have been proposed, such as technicolor or low energy su-
persymmetry, were ever free of difficulties. In particular, giving up low
energy supersymmetry can restore some of the most attractive features of
the non-supersymmetric standard model: automatic conservation of baryon
and lepton number in interactions up to dimension 5 and 4, respectively;
13V.Agrawal, S. M. Barr, J. F. Donoghue, and D. Seckel, Phys. Rev. D 57, 5480 (1998).
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natural conservation of flavors in neutral currents; and a small neutron elec-
tric dipole moment. Arkani-Hamed and Dimopoulos14 have even shown how
it is possible to keep the good features of supersymmetry, such as a more
accurate convergence of the SU(3) × SU(2) × U(1) couplings to a single
value, and the presence of candidates for dark matter WIMPs. The idea
of this “split supersymmetry” is that, although supersymmetry is broken
at some very high energy, the gauginos and higgsinos are kept light by a
chiral symmetry. [An additional discrete symmetry is needed to prevent
lepton-number violation in higgsino-lepton mixing, and to keep the lightest
supersymmetric particle stable.] One of the nice things about split super-
symmetry is that, unlike many of the things we talk about these days, it
makes predictions that can be checked when the LHC starts operation. One
expects a single neutral Higgs with a mass in the range 120 to 165 GeV,
possible winos and binos but no squarks or sleptons, and a long-lived gluino.
(Incidentally, a Stanford group15 has recently used considerations of big bang
nucleosynthesis to argue that a 1 TeV gluino must have a lifetime less than
100 seconds, indicating a supersymmetry breaking scale less than 1010 GeV,
which might create problems for proton stability. But I wonder whether,
even if the gluino has a longer lifetime and decays after nucleosynthesis, the
universe might not thereby be reheated above the temperature of helium
dissociation, giving big bang nucleosynthesis a second chance to produce
the observed helium abundance.)
What about the dimensionless Yukawa couplings of the Standard Model?
Hogan16 has analyzed the anthropic constraints on these couplings, with the
electroweak symmetry breaking scale and the sum of the u and d Yukawa
couplings held fixed, to avoid complications due to the dependence of nuclear
forces on the pion mass. He imposes the conditions that (1) md − mu −
me > 1.2 MeV, so that the early universe doesn’t become all neutrons; (2)
md −mu +me < 3.4 MeV, so that the pp reaction is exothermic, and (3)
me > 0. With three conditions on the two parameters mu −md and me, he
naturally finds these parameters are limited to a finite region, which turns
out to be quite small. At first sight, this gives the impression that the quark
and lepton Yukawa couplings are subject to stringent anthropic constraints,
14N. Arkani-Hamed and S. Dimopoulos, JHEP 0506, 073 (2005). Also see G. F. Giudice
and A. Romanino, Nucl. Phys. B 699, 65 (2004); N. Arkani-Hamed, S. Dimopoulos, G. F.
Giudice, and A. Romanino, Nucl. Phys. B 709, 3 (2005); A. Delgado and G. F. Giudice,
hep-ph/0506217.
15A. Arvanitaki, C. Davis, P. W. Graham, A. Pierce, and J. G. Wacker, hep-ph/0504210.
16C. Hogan, Rev. Mod. Phys. 72, 1149 (2000); and astro-ph/0407086.
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in which case we might infer that the Yukawa couplings probably scan.
I have two reservations about this conclusion. The first reservation is
that the pp reaction is not necessary for life. For one thing, the pep reaction
p+p+e− → d+ν can keep stars burning hydrogen for a long time. For this,
we do not need md −mu +me < 3.4 MeV, but only the weaker condition
md − mu − me < 3.4 MeV. The three conditions then do not constrain
md − mu and me separately to any finite region, but only constrain the
single parameter md −mu −me to lie between 1.2 MeV and 3.4 MeV, not
a very tight anthropic constraint. (In fact, He4 will be stable as long as
md − mu − me is less than about 13 MeV, so stellar nucleosynthesis can
begin with helium burning in the heavy stars of Population III, followed
by hydrogen burning in later generations of stars.) My second reservation
is that the anthropic constraints on the Yukawa couplings are alleviated if
we suppose (as discussed above) that the electroweak symmetry breaking
scale is not fixed, but free to take whatever value is anthropically necessary.
For instance, according to the results of reference 13, the deuteron binding
energy could be made as large as about 3.5 MeV by taking the electroweak
breaking scale much less than it is in our universe, in which case even the
condition that the pp reaction be exothermic becomes much looser.
Incidentally, I don’t set much store by the famous “coincidence” em-
phasized by Hoyle, that there is an excited state of C12 with just the right
energy to allow carbon production via α–Be8 reactions in stars. We know
that even–even nuclei have states that are well described as composites of
α-particles. One such state is the ground state of Be8, which is unsta-
ble against fission into two alpha particles. The same α-α potential that
produces that sort of unstable state in Be8 could naturally be expected to
produce an unstable state in C12 that is essentially a composite of three α
particles, and that therefore appears as a low-energy resonance in α–Be8
reactions. So the existence of this state doesn’t seem to me to provide any
evidence of fine tuning.
What else scans? Tegmark and Rees17 have raised the question whether
the rms density fluctuation σ may itself scan. If it does, then the anthropic
constraint on the vacuum energy becomes weaker, resuscitating to some
extent the problem of why ρV is so small. But Garriga and Vilenkin
18 have
pointed out that it is really ρV /σ
3 that is constrained anthropically, so that
even if σ does scan the anthropic prediction of this ratio remains robust.
17M. Tegmark and M. J. Rees, Astrophys. J. 499, 526 (1998).
18J. Garriga and A. Vilenkin, hep-th/0508005.
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Arkani-Hamed, Dimopoulos, and Kachru19 have offered a possible rea-
son to suppose that most constants do not scan. If there are a large number
N of decoupled modular fields, each taking a few possible values, then the
probability distribution of quantities that depend on all these fields will be
sharply peaked, with a width proportional to 1/
√
N . According to Distler
and Varadarajan,20 it is not really necessary here to make arbitrary assump-
tions about the decoupling of the various scalar fields; it is enough to adopt
the most general polynomial superpotential that is stable, in the sense that
radiative corrections do not change the effective couplings for large N by
amounts larger than the couplings themselves. Distler and Varadarajan em-
phasize cubic superpotentials, because polynomial superpotentials of order
higher than cubic presumably make no physical sense. But it is not clear
that even cubic superpotentials can be plausible approximations, or that
peaks will occur at reasonable values in the distribution of dimensionless
couplings rather than of some combinations of these couplings.21 It also
is not clear that the multiplicity of vacua in this kind of effective scalar
field theory can properly represent the multiplicity of flux values in string
theories,22 but even if not, it presumably can represent the variety of minima
of the potential for a given set of flux vacua.
If most constants do not effectively scan, then why should anthropic ar-
guments work for the vacuum energy and the electroweak breaking scale?
ADK point out that, even if some constant has a relatively narrow distribu-
tion, anthropic arguments will still apply if the anthropically allowed range is
even narrower and near a point around which the distribution is symmetric.
(ADK suppose that this point would be at zero, but this is not necessary.)
This is the case, for instance, for the vacuum energy if the superpotentialW
is the sum of the superpotentials Wn for a large number of decoupled scalar
fields, for each of which there is a separate broken R symmetry, so that the
possible values of each Wn are equal and opposite. The probability distri-
bution of the total superpotential W =
∑
N
n=1Wn will then be a Gaussian
peaked at W = 0 with a width proportional to 1/
√
N , and the probability
distribution of the supersymmetric vacuum energy −8piG|W |2 will extend
over a correspondingly narrow range of negative values, with a maximum
at zero. When supersymmetry breaking is taken into account, the proba-
19N. Arkani-Hamed, S. Dimopoulos, and S. Kachru, hep-th/0501082, referred to below
as ADK.
20J. Distler and U. Varadarajan, hep-th/0507090.
21M. Douglas, private communication.
22T. Banks, hep-th/0011255.
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bility distribution widens to include positive values of the vacuum energy,
extending out to a positive value depending on the scale of supersymmetry
breaking. For any reasonable supersymmetry breaking scale, this probability
distribution, though narrow compared with the Planck scale, will be very
wide compared with the vary narrow anthropically allowed range around
ρV = 0, so within this range the probability distribution can be expected
to be flat, and anthropic arguments should work. Similar remarks apply to
the µ-term of the supersymmetric Standard Model, which sets the scale of
electroweak symmetry breaking.
III. How should we calculate anthropically conditioned probabili-
ties?
We would expect the anthropically conditioned probability distribution
for a given value of any constant that scans to be proportional to the num-
ber of scientific civilizations that observe that value. In the calculations
described above, Martel, Shapiro, and I took this number to be propor-
tional to the fraction of baryons that find themselves in galaxies, but what
if the total number of baryons itself scans? What if it is infinite?
IV. How is the landscape populated?
There are at least four ways in which we might imagine the different
“universes” described by the string landscape actually to exist:
1. The various subuniverses may be simply different regions of space.
This is most simply realized in the chaotic inflation theory.23 The
scalar fields in different inflating patches may take different values,
giving rise to different values for various effective coupling constants.
Indeed, Linde speculated about the application of the anthropic prin-
ciple to cosmology soon after the proposal of chaotic inflation.24
2. The subuniverses may be different eras of time in a single big bang. For
instance, what appear to be constants of nature might actually depend
on scalar fields that change very slowly as the universe expands.25
23A. D. Linde, Phys. Lett. 129B, 177 (1983); A. Vilenkin, Phys. Rev. D 27, 2848
(1983); A. D. Linde, Phys. Lett. B 175, 305 (1986); Phys. Scripta T15, 100 (1987);
Phys. Lett. B202, 194 (1988).
24A. D. Linde, in The Very Early Universe, ed. G. W. Gibbons, S. W. Hawking, and
S. Siklos (Cambridge University Press, 1983); Rept. Progr. Phys. 47, 925 (1984).
25T. Banks, Nucl. Phys. B 249, 332 (1985).
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3. The subuniverses may be different regions of spacetime. This can
happen if, instead of changing smoothly with time, various scalar fields
on which the “constants” of nature depend change in a sequence of
first-order phase transitions.26 In these transitions metastable bubbles
form within a region of higher vacuum energy; then within each bubble
there form further bubbles of even lower vacuum energy; and so on.
In recent years this idea has been revived in the context of the string
landscape.27
4. The subuniverses could be different parts of quantummechanical Hilbert
space. In a reinterpretation of Hawking’s earlier work on the wave
function of the universe,28 Coleman29 showed that certain topological
fixtures known as wormholes in the path integral for the Euclidean
wave function of the universe would lead to a superposition of wave
functions in which any coupling constant not constrained by symmetry
principles would take any possible value. Ooguri, Vafa, and Verlinde30
have argued for a particular wave function of the universe, but it es-
capes me how anyone can tell whether this or any other proposed wave
function is the wave function of the universe.
These alternatives are by no means mutually exclusive. In particular, it
seems to me that, whatever one concludes about alternatives 1, 2, and 3,
26L. Abbott, Phys. Lett. B150, 427 (1985); J. D. Brown and C. Teitelboim, Phys.
Lett. B 195, 177 (1987); Nucl. Phys. B 297, 787 (1987).
27R. Bousso and J. Polchinski, op. cit.; J. L. Feng, J. March-Russel, S. Sethi, and F.
Wilczek, Nucl. Phys. B 602, 307 (2001); H. Firouzjahi, S. Sarangji, and S.-H. Henry
Tye, JHEP 0409, 060 (2004); B.Freivogel, M. Kleban, M. R. Martinez, and L. Susskind,
hep-th/0505232.
28S. W. Hawking, Nucl. Phys. B 239, 257 (1984); and in Relativity, Groups, and
Topology II, NATO Advanced Study Institute Session XL, Les Houches, 1983, ed. B.S.
DeWitt and R. Stora (Elsevier, Amsterdam, 1984): p. 336. Some of this work is based
on an initial condition for the origin of the universe proposed by J. Hartle and S. W.
Hawking, Phys. Rev. D 28, 2960 (1983).
29S. Coleman, Nucl. Phys. B 307, 867 (1988). It has been argued that the wave
function of the universe is sharply peaked at values of the constants that yield a zero
vacuum energy at late times, by S. W. Hawking, in Shelter Island II — Proceedings of the
1983 Shelter Island Conference on Quantum Field Theory and the Fundamental Problems
of Physics, ed. R. Jackiw et al. (MIT Press, Cambridge, 1985); Phys. Lett. B 134, 403
(1984); E. Baum, Phys. Lett. B 133, 185 (1984); S. Coleman, Nucl. Phys. B 310, 643
(1985). This view has been challenged; see W. Fischler, I. Klebanov, J. Polchinski, and
L. Susskind, Nucl. Phys. B 237, 157 (1989). I am assuming here that there are no such
peaks.
30H. Ooguri, C. Vafa, and E. Verlinde, hep-th/0502211.
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we will still have the possibility that the wave function of the universe is
a superposition of different terms representing different ways of populating
the landscape in space and/or time.
In closing, I would like to comment about the impact of anthropic rea-
soning within and beyond the physics community. Some physicists have
expressed a strong distaste for anthropic arguments. (I have heard David
Gross say “I hate it.”) This is understandable. Theories based on anthropic
calculation certainly represent a retreat from what we had hoped for: the
calculation of all fundamental parameters from first principles. It is too soon
to give up on this hope, but without loving it we may just have to resign
ourselves to a retreat, just as Newton had to give up Kepler’s hope of a
calculation of the relative sizes of planetary orbits from first principles.
There is also a less creditable reason for hostility to the idea of a multi-
verse, based on the fact that we will never be able to observe any subuni-
verses except our own. Livio and Rees31 and Tegmark32 have given thor-
ough discussions of various other ingredients of accepted theories that we
will never be able to observe, without our being led to reject these theories.
The test of a physical theory is not that everything in it should be observable
and every prediction it makes should be testable, but rather that enough
is observable and enough predictions are testable to give us confidence that
the theory is right.
Finally, I have heard the objection that, in trying to explain why the
laws of nature are so well suited for the appearance and evolution of life,
anthropic arguments take on some of the flavor of religion. I think that
just the opposite is the case. Just as Darwin and Wallace explained how
the wonderful adaptations of living forms could arise without supernatural
intervention, so the string landscape may explain how the constants of nature
that we observe can take values suitable for life without being fine-tuned by
a benevolent creator. I found this parallel well understood in a surprising
place, a New York Times op-ed article by Christoph Scho¨nborn, Cardinal
Archbishop of Vienna.33 His article concludes as follows:
“Now, at the beginning of the 21st century, faced with scien-
tific claims like neo-Darwinism and the multiverse hypothesis in
cosmology invented to avoid the overwhelming evidence for pur-
31M. Livio and M. J. Rees, Science 309, 1022 (12 August, 2003).
32M. Tegmark, Ann. Phys. 270, 1 (1998).
33C. Scho¨nborn, N. Y. Times, 7 July 2005, p. A23.
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pose and design found in modern science, the Catholic Church
will again defend human nature by proclaiming that the imma-
nent design evident in nature is real. Scientific theories that try
to explain away the appearance of design as the result of ‘chance
and necessity’ are not scientific at all, but, as John Paul put it,
an abdication of human intelligence.”
It’s nice to see work in cosmology get some of the attention given these days
to evolution, but of course it is not religious preconceptions like these that
can decide any issues in science.
It must be acknowledged that there is a big difference in the degree
of confidence we can have in neo-Darwinism and in the multiverse. It is
settled, as well as anything in science is ever settled, that the adaptations
of living things on earth have come into being through natural selection
acting on random undirected inheritable variations. About the multiverse,
it is appropriate to keep an open mind, and opinions among scientists differ
widely. In the Austin airport on the way to this meeting I noticed for sale
the October issue of a magazine called Astronomy, having on the cover the
headline “Why You Live in Multiple Universes.” Inside I found a report of
a discussion at a conference at Stanford, at which Martin Rees said that
he was sufficiently confident about the multiverse to bet his dog’s life on
it, while Andrei Linde said he would bet his own life. As for me, I have
just enough confidence about the multiverse to bet the lives of both Andrei
Linde and Martin Rees’s dog.
‘
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